Arash khaksari renani; Mir Saeed Mousavi Karimi
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to criticize Daniel Dennett's main argument which has been formulated to explain and justify the compatibility of Human's mental phenomena, particularly his free will, with causal determinism on the basis of ontological naturalism (Physicalism). The article begins with ...
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The purpose of this article is to criticize Daniel Dennett's main argument which has been formulated to explain and justify the compatibility of Human's mental phenomena, particularly his free will, with causal determinism on the basis of ontological naturalism (Physicalism). The article begins with the formulation of this argument. Then, the theories of naturalism and evolution as the backgrounds of Dennett's thesis are explained. Dennett tries to justify the premises of his argument by a novel interpretation of casual determinism based on a difference between casual determinism and inevitability. Finally, it is shown that Dennett's solution for making a compatibility between free will and causal determinism is insufficient and unsatisfactory, and, thus, he has not solved the deep and historical problem of compatibilism.
